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1.  Introductory remarks  
 
 Financial  system  development  makes  important  contributions  to  economic 
performance. A well functioning financial system channels financial resources and 
capital to productive use, and spurs economic growth. In turn, excessive regulation 
and government intervention can severely interfere with the proper functioning of 
financial institutions. 
 
During  many  years,  and  through  the  1990s,  limited  access  to  bank  credit  and 
uncertainty about macroeconomic and financial stability imposed serious constraints 
on Latin America’s growth and contributed to high volatility. As these facts became 
increasingly recognized, many countries of the Western Hemisphere took steps to 
reform,  and  liberalize  their  financial  systems,  including  reductions  in  government 
controls. Financial liberalization spurred credit growth during the early part of the 
1990s, but bank lending slowed after a series of banking crises in the mid-1990s. 
Subsequently,  bank  restructuring  and  regulatory  reforms  were  introduced  to  help 
strengthen banking systems in a number of countries. Such reforms have generally 
been  successful  in  increasing  financial  intermediation  and  in  improving  economic 
performance. In the process of reform, however, there was a need to attain a balance 
between  appropriate  liberalization  and  adequate  government  prudential  and  policy 
regulation concurrently. Failure to accomplish a proper balance has lead to financial 
crises such as those that recently hit several countries. 
 
Investment and finance also have become a global matter, and, for developing and 
developed economies alike, countries must integrate their domestic financial systems 
into  the  emerging  global  system.  With  an  eye  on  that  ultimate  objective,  many 
countries are coordinating their liberalization and integration efforts with neighboring 
countries.  The  best-known  examples  of  sub-regional  cooperation  and  integration 
efforts  are  the  Asia-Pacific  region  and  the  EU.  A  number  of  institutions  in  the 
Americas are also supporting the move toward financial integration, although at much 
earlier stages of the process. 
 
This  presentation  seeks  to  explain  how  financial  sector  developments  have  been 
related to the structural characteristics of Latin American economies, and to highlight 
some  of  the  financial  sector  failures  that  have  affected  Latin  America’s 
macroeconomic performance. The analysis presented here provides evidence of the 
need to strengthen Latin America’s efforts to ensure financial system soundness and 
promote deeper financial intermediation. 
                                                 
1 This background paper was prepared as background for the Forum of Emerging Economies (Jakarta, 
September 2006). It constitutes a survey of existing material, produced by a number of institutions, 
particularly the IMF, IADB, INTAL, CAF, and the World Bank. Specifically, this documents draws 
heavily on the following works: Stabilization and Reform in Latin America: A Macroeconomic Perspective on 
the Experience since the Early 1990s. Anoop Singh, et. al. (International Monetary Fund, Occasional Paper #238, 
2005); Beyond Borders: The New Regionalism in Latin America, Inter-American Development: Bank, (2003); 
Recovering Growth in Latin America: Trade, Productivity and Social Inclusion, RED, CAF, (2005). 
Important comments made by Harinder Kohli and Graciana del Castillo have been incorporated into the 
text. However, any mistakes and misquotes are the responsibility of the author of this note. 
  12.  Key Characteristics of Latin American Financial Systems  
 
a.  Market Structure 
Latin  American  financial  systems  are  largely  bank-based,  with  security  markets 
mostly small and illiquid. Banking systems are highly concentrated, intermediation 
margins are high, and the scale of bank lending is low relative to economic activity.  
Banks  have  had  a  comparative  advantage  in  the  collection  and  processing  of 
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In most Latin American countries, the private sector’s use of bond and equity markets 
to raise finance remains limited, relative to its recourse to banks, although, in some 
countries,  pension  reforms  have  begun  to  encourage  broader  capital  market 
development.  Despite  their  prominence,  banking  systems  remain  relatively  small 
compared with GDP, and the depth of intermediation is particularly low. Deposit-to-
GDP ratios are less than 50 percent, compared with typical ratios of 90 percent in East 
Asian emerging markets.
2 Moreover, bank credit represents only a fraction of bank 
assets. In most countries, excepting Chile and Ecuador, lending represents no more 
than  a  third  of  bank  assets.  Again  excepting  Chile,  the  ratio  of  bank  credit  to 
economic activity remains much smaller than in the bank based financial systems of 
the  advanced  economies  of  the  euro  area  and  Japan,  or  of  the  emerging  market 
economies of Asia. Furthermore, lending is directed tom a large extent to consumer 
                                                 
2 Even though financial intermediation rose in recent years, it took Mexico 5 years after the 1994 crisis 
before bank intermediation was reactivated and then loans were mostly for consumption. 10 years latter, consumer 
credit is less than 4% of GDP (as compared to 8% in Chile and 17% in the US). In Uruguay, 4 years after the 
banking crisis bank lending is short term and basically for consumption.  
  2credit, rather than investment, which tends to be financed from retained earnings or 
non-bank and foreign sources. 
 
Table #2: Bank Deposits (US dollars and percent of GDP 
  US$    %GDP 
       
World  49600    121 
European Union  22100    180 
USA  7900    68 
Japan  7200    153 
Emerging Economies  8100    82 
Asia  5700    127 
Latin America  920    46 
Source: IMF, Global Financial Stability Report, April 2006 
 
The pattern of credit growth in Latin America has been marked by boom-bust cycles. 
Credit growth was particularly rapid in the early 1990s, but collapsed in many cases 
after banking crises in the mid-1990s and has since remained subdued. Argentina, 
Brazil, and Mexico all follow this pattern, although in Mexico the growth of other 
sources  of  financial  intermediation  has  partly  compensated  for  the  lack  of  bank 
activity. Chile has managed to achieve a more even pattern of credit growth, because 






















  3Financial Liberalization 





Over  this  period,  a  rising  share  of  bank  balance  sheets  has  been  absorbed  by 
government securities. During the second half of the 1990s, after serious banking 
crises,  many  banks  in  Latin  America  shed  nonperforming  loans  and  obtained  in 
exchange, sizable portfolios of government bonds. For public banks, this typically 
occurred  through  restructuring,  with  bad  credits  being  replaced  by  government 
securities—  for  example,  in  Mexico  after  the  1994  banking  crisis.  In  the  private 
sector, this shift was often a reaction to experience with high default rates on lending 
to  households  and  corporations  and  to  a  tightening  of  supervisory  standards  after 
setbacks to stabilization and reforms in the mid-1990s. As banks shared in the costs of 
these crises, they sought to hold significant amounts of high-yielding, apparently safer 
government bonds. For example, Argentine banks’ holdings of such bonds more than 
doubled  in  1995;  and  in  Brazil,  about  a  third  of  banks’  assets  were  invested  in 
government bonds by 2000. 
 
The process of bank restructuring that occurred during the 1990s led to rising foreign 
ownership  of  Latin  American  banking  systems.  During  this  process,  legal  and 
regulatory limitations on the activities of foreign banks were relaxed or eliminated in 
most  countries.  Foreign  banks  gained  market  shares,  mostly  by  taking  control  of 
domestic banks in need of fresh capital and new management rather than opening new 
institutions. In Brazil, for example, foreign banks grew from an insignificant presence 
in the mid-1990s to hold one-fifth of deposits and provide one-fourth of credit by the 
end of 2000. In Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela, foreign 
banks owned more than half of banking-system assets by 2000 (Table 3). 
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Table #3: Selected Latin American Countries: Structure of Banking Systems       
Argentina   Brazil   Chile  Colombia   Ecuador   Mexico  Paraguay   Peru   Uruguay  Venezuela   
Institutions                      
Number of banks   71  135  28  32  40  35  22  15  23  39 
          (In percent)          
Concentration—Top 10 banks                    
Share of total assets   62  70  76  67  82  95  79  95  87  81 
Share of total deposits   71  77  78  68  79  90  79  96  85  36 
Share of total credit   66  70  80  65  78  93  59  94  88  64 
Foreign bank participation                      
Number of banks1   28  27  18  11  …  20  17  12  16  21 
          (In percent)          
Share of total assets   54  28  60  21  …  82  81  64  35  68 
Share of total deposits   48  21  47  20  …  82  86  62  34  67 
Share of total credit   46  25  45  21  …  77  74  62  35  72 
Sources: National central banks and bank supervisory agencies; and IMF staff calculations. Singh et. al.       
Note: This table considers only deposit-taking universal banks. Data are for 2000, except for Uruguay and Mexico, for 
which 2002 data are used.        
 
1Domestic banks with foreign participation or control. Offshore banks are not included.        
 
A few large banks typically account for a large share of the system’s assets. Bank 
restructuring  that  occurred  during  the  1990s  also  led  to  increasing  concentration. 
Typically,  more  than  two  thirds  of  bank  assets are concentrated in the 10 largest 
institutions, which hold about 70 percent of deposits and provide 75 percent of credit. 
The  largest  institutions  often  remain  in  government  hands,  however.  This  is 
particularly true of Brazil and Argentina, where a few public banks still account for a 
significant share of banking-system assets and credit. Many Latin American public 
banks were endowed with the role of providing credit to targeted segments of the 
economy, often poorer regions and sectors that had been left outside conventional 
channels  of  financing  (e.g.,  housing,  regional  development,  agriculture).  Such 
operations  remain  important,  although  questions  have  been  raised  about  the  cost-
effectiveness  and  governance  of  such  activities,  and  alternative  mechanisms—
including community based microfinance—are being developed to deliver credit to 
such sectors.  
 
The high degree of concentration suggests a lack of competition among banks that 
may  be  a  concern.  Economies  of  scale  may  be  important  in  containing  costs  and 
taking advantage of new information technologies. A lack of competition, however, 
may  also  result  in  excessively  high  prices  or  quantity  rationing  for  customers.  In 
small, advanced economies, too, the banking system is often highly concentrated, but 
banks  typically  face  strong  competition  from  securities  markets  and  non-bank 
financial  intermediaries,  as  well  as  offshore  markets.  In  Latin  America,  however, 
financing from securities markets is usually available to only a limited range of top-
quality corporate borrowers.  
 
  5Reforms  to  introduce  private  pension  systems  provided  an  important  impetus  to 
financial system development in Latin America during the 1990s. Chile was the first 
to  replace  a  state-run,  pay-as-you-go  pension  system  with  a  privately  managed, 
individually funded system in 1981. Its lead was subsequently followed in Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and elsewhere. These pension funds can, 
however, be vulnerable targets for governments looking for financing. For example, 
Argentina’s pension funds have suffered heavy losses after being forced to invest 
sizable shares of their portfolios in government paper, and after the collapse of the 
economy in 2001-02.  
 
b.  Bank Profitability 
Latin American banks’ profitability improved during the 1990s, but their returns on 
assets and equity remain below those in industrial countries. This has occurred despite 
high interest margins on private lending. Interest spreads on lending to the private 
sector  have  declined  somewhat  during  the  past  decade  but  remain  high  by 
international  standards.  Intermediation  margins  averaged  more  than  50  percentage 
points in Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay during the 1990s.
3 In part, the weak profitability 
performance reflects a continued reliance on interest earnings, both from lending and 
from government bonds. 
Other sources of income, such as commissions from asset management and fees from 
securities trading, remain limited.  
In times of high inflation, bank revenues from bonds indexed to the overnight interest 
rate exceeded the less frequently adjusted interest rate paid on deposits, providing 
banks with easy profits. Although incentives for cost reduction have increased since 
inflation was brought down across the region, banks’ operating costs remain high, 
about a third higher than in banks in advanced countries, as productivity in the sector 
is lower, in part due to strong unionization in the sector. Nonperforming loans have 
been  an  additional  burden  on  bank  costs.  Although  restructuring  since  the  mid-
1990s—including  by  the  government  swapping  bad  loans  for  public  securities—
improved the quality of bank lending, nonperforming loans continue to represent a 
large share of loan portfolios.  
 
c.  Dollarization 
 In a number of countries, a large and rising share of both bank deposits and credits 
have been denominated in U.S. dollars. For example, in Bolivia, dollar deposits rose 
from 65 percent of total deposits in 1990 to 74 percent in 2001 and to about 95 
percent  in  2003.  In  some  countries,  formal  dollarization  was  deliberately  used  to 
provide a nominal anchor for the economy. In 1991, Argentina adopted a currency 
board guaranteeing full convertibility between dollars and pesos, and intermediation 
was increasingly denominated in dollars until the collapse of the regime in 2002. 
Ecuador in 1999 and El Salvador in 2001 chose full dollarization to bolster price 
stability.  Of  course,  conditions  were  different  in  both  countries.  In  Ecuador, 
dollarization was imposed as a way to come out of a major currency crisis, while in 
the case of El Salvador, the actions were taken to preserve stability, that had been 
achieved already, while helping reduce interest rates and accelerate the process of 
integration with the  rest of the world. 
                                                 
3 Spreads are about 13% in Latin America while the average in emerging Asia and the industrialized countries is 
about 3%. High spreads existed before financial liberalization, and were the consequence of non-remunerated 
reserve requirements, and to a lesser extent, private crowding out by the public sector. Taxes on financial 
intermediation, imposed as a quick way of the crisis, also contributes to the high spreads.  
  6Some countries avoided dollarization altogether or were able to reduce it. Brazil and, 
to some extent, Mexico have prohibited most holdings of foreign currency deposits 
for non-transactions purposes, while Chile and Colombia have used strict prudential 
guidelines to reduce the incentives to hold foreign currency deposits. Placing a ban on 
foreign  currency  deposits  or  discouraging  their  use,  however,  also  served  to 
encourage the shifting of financial assets offshore. Deposits held by Argentines and 
Venezuelans in the United States far exceed the countries’ broad money. For all of 
Latin America, IMF data suggests that total financial assets (excluding international 
reserves) held abroad amounted to some US$ 480 billion in 2005, about 23 percent of 
GDP, and somewhat below the level of broad money.  
 
In recent years there has been a trend that runs against dollarization. With the EMBI 
spread  down  to  about  200  bps,  fixed-income  investors  have  moved  away  from 
investing in Latin America public sector external debt into local market instruments. 
This trend has been positive in developing or strengthening local debt markets in 
Latin America and is allowing governments to reduce the currency risk of their debt 
portfolios. At the same time, there has also been increasing investment in corporate 
bonds and particularly in equity, where markets are still shallow in the region. 
 
3.  Underlying Weaknesses 
The  features  of  the  Latin  American  financial  systems  today  reflect  a  series  of 
underlying weaknesses common to most countries in the region. 
a.  Low Savings rates hindered the deepening of domestic financial markets in Latin 
America in the 1990s. However, low bank intermediation coexisted with a wide 
range of saving rates; and, similarly, loan ratios and saving rates did not seem to 
be consistently determined by per capita GDP.  
b.  In most Latin American countries, an unstable macroeconomic environment has 
been  a  critical  factor  holding  back  financial  system  development.  Chronic 
inflation, periodic external crises, and intermittent deposit freezes imposed heavy 
losses on holders of financial assets. Even after success in bringing down inflation 
across  Latin  America,  inflexible  exchange  rate  regimes  and  excessive  fiscal 
deficits  continued  to  undermine  confidence  and  bring  instability.  High 
unremunerated  reserve  requirements  reduced  banks’  available  resources. 
Similarly,  a  number  of  countries  have  resorted  to  financial  transaction  taxes, 
which have tended to discourage financial intermediation. 
c.  Latin American banks have also had to cope with a range of structural factors, 
mostly microeconomic and  institutional in nature deterred banks from engaging 
in lending to the private sector:  Frequent crises destroyed the old client base and 
new customers had no credit record; inadequate auditing and accounting standards 
and practices hampered banks’ ability to monitor both financial and non-financial 
companies; legislative frameworks typically did not support the enforceability of 
creditors’ rights once loans became overdue. 
4 
d.  Latin American financial systems have had to cope with highly volatile capital 
inflows. Private inflows rose from a yearly average of US$10 billion during 1983–
90 to US$62 billion by 1998, before declining to about half that amount in recent 
                                                 
4 According to calculations by Galindo and Micco (2001), if Latin American countries could increase 
the effective protection of creditors to the level of the developed countries, their financial markets 
would deepen on average 15 additional percentage points. Creditors’ rights and law enforcement are 
lagging even in comparison with other regions with legal frameworks of the same origin (for example, 
some Asian countries). 
  7years. Capital inflows were accompanied by rapid expansions of bank credit and 
consumption booms—and strong contractions and busts when they reversed. With 
limited resources from reserves and official sources, domestic policies became 
pro-cyclical and reduced the capacity of the government and banks to react to 
crises. 
 
4.  Banking Crises and Reforms 
Over the past ten years, banking-system fragilities contributed to a series of financial 
crises. A first wave of crises hit several Latin American countries during the mid-
1990s, starting in 1994 with Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela, followed by 
Argentina  and  Paraguay  in  1995,  and  Ecuador  in  1996.  Banks  were  restructured 
and/or recapitalized, at great fiscal cost, while regulatory systems were overhauled. In 
many cases the reforms were successful, but in others it was not the case. A second 
wave  of  crises  hit  several  banking  systems,  including  those  in  Ecuador  in  1999, 
Argentina in 2001, Uruguay in 2002, and the Dominican Republic in 2003. Bolivia 
has experienced banking-system stress more recently, in 2003–2004. 
 
The experience clearly demonstrates the potential for rapid contagion across borders. 
In the wake of the 1994 Mexico crisis, Argentine were seen as particularly exposed 
because of questions about the government’s ability to defend the currency board 
Similar  forces  put  the  banking  system  of  Uruguay  in  danger,  after  the  Argentine 
financial system collapsed in 2002. Microeconomic influences, such as poor bank 
management and prudential regulation and bank supervision, were also responsible 
for bank problems in a number of countries.
5  
 
Latin American crises were typically not as expensive to resolve as those that afflicted 
Asia in 1997–98. The most costly crises in Latin America (in  Argentina, Ecuador, 
Mexico, and Venezuela) cost around 20 percent of GDP to resolve, about one third to 
one half the costs of the costs of dealing with the crises in Indonesia, Korea, and 
Thailand. 
 
To deal with these banking crises, governments across Latin America implemented a 
series of banking-system reforms aimed at resolving weak banks and strengthening 
regulation and supervision, including mergers, restructurings, privatizations, stronger 
prudential regulations, including on off-shore operations, and accounting regulations 
were strengthened, and foreign participation was liberalized.  
 
5.  Financial Integration    
Financial integration in Latin America has been strongly linked to integration on other 
fronts. Integration through trade and FDI has been an important determinant of the 
integration in banking and cross listing of equity. Two features have been notable 
since the liberalization process of the 1990s. Large international banks have increased 
their presence in the region (as noted above), and firms have gained the ability to 
                                                 
5The banking crisis in Uruguay was not only the result of contagion. In addition to the fiscal and 
macroeconomic problems that affected the banks negatively, there was plain fraud in two large banks 
and 
supervision was lax. Regarding contagion, problems arose because a number of banks were holding 
Argentine bonds to back non-resident deposits. When the supervision authorities required that they 
exchange such bonds for loans to creditworthy companies, the companies were unable to do so because 
of a freeze on banking system transactions (corralito) in Argentina. 
  8increase their sources of funding by tapping international capital markets directly, 
mostly through the listing of Depositary Receipts (DRs) on foreign stock markets. 
Through these mechanisms, firms have been allowed to issue cheaper debt abroad and 
foreign  banks  have  been  allowed  to  penetrate  financial  markets,  including  the 
administration of pension funds and insurance companies.   
 
Advances in formal regional financial cooperation have been very limited among the 
Latin American countries. Aside from NAFTA, where agreements are in place to 
proceed with the integration of the financial markets of Canada, Mexico and the US 
there has not been much progress in regional financial service liberalization beyond 
approval of protocols. However, some initiatives are worth noting, such as certain 
efforts to integrate stock markets, as well as the creation of sub-regional development 
banks  in  Central  America  (BCIE),  the  Andean  area  (CAF),  the  Southern  Cone 
(FONPLATA) and CARICOM (CDB). In recent months MERCOSUR countries have 
also announce their intention to establish a new development bank, but no details are 
yet  known  about  the  initiative.  Some  CARICOM  countries  have  moved  toward  a 
regional stock market with cross-listing and trading in securities on existing stock 
exchanges. The small islands of the Association of Eastern Caribbean States have a 
long-functioning  common  currency  and  a  common  central  bank.  Meanwhile,  at  a 
regional  level,  ALADI  developed  a  reciprocal  payments  system  to  finance  trade 
among  members  in  1966.  The  system,  designed  to  overcome  foreign  exchange 
obstacles to trade, is currently facilitating only a small proportion of total regional 
trade. One of the areas in which the issue of financial integration is attracting attention 
is the Central American Common Market. While some efforts have been made in 
Central America, efforts are needed to move towards consolidated regulation with 
common standards across countries. 
 
 In  the  end,  other  than  the  increased  participation  of  foreign  banks  in  different 
countries and the trading of securities in developed countries through REITs, little 
progress has been achieved in regional integration. Institutional features in individual 
countries  have  precluded  adequate  cooperation  in  this  regard.  Policies  such  as 
eliminating controls for foreign agent participation or creating specific agreements 
among countries can serve as a basis for financial integration. Such agreements have 
been few, however. Future financial integration can also be enhanced by adopting 
international best practices regarding accounting standards, disclosure and sharing of 
information, and tax regimes. Even if full harmonization of regulations is reached, 
however, problems with key national institutions and macroeconomic instability can 
hinder the process of financial integration both with the developed world and within 
the  region.  Protection  of  property  rights  and  legal  stability  are  needed  to  attract 
regional and international players into Latin America. 
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